Contents of this section:
Section F.1: Status of the Iowa class battleships
Section F.2: Grounding of USS Missouri in 1950
Section F.3: Decommissioning/disposal of US cruisers (CG/CGN) during the 1990's.
Section F.4: Meaning of warship types, i.e. "frigate","cruiser" and "destroyer"
Section F.5: The wrecks of Scapa Flow
Section F.6: Royal Navy losses during the Falkands War
Section F.7: Aluminum in warship construction
Section F.8 The 1975 reclassification of US cruisers, frigates and ocean escorts
Section F.9: The destroyer disaster at Honda Point, CA in 1923
Section F.10: The "stealth ship", Sea Shadow
Section F.11: Alaska class: large cruisers or battlecruisers?
Section F.12: Long Beach's Guns, and guns on "all missile" ships
Section F.13: Ships damaged in the Persian Gulf
Section F.14: Gun Calibers

Following the demise of the "600 ship fleet" and the Cold War the Iowa class battleships were decommissioned. The major reason for their decommissioning was economics. They required a crew of almost 1600 men; their missile payload was about 78% of Spruance class destroyer's, but the destroyer has 22% of an Iowa's crew. Their unique gunfire support capability was judged not to be worth the cost (in $$$ and manpower) of maintaining them in service. They were decommissioned on the following dates:

	Iowa (BB 61)            26 Oct 1990
	New Jersey (BB 62)      9 Sept 1991
	Missouri (BB 63)        31 March 1992
	Wisconsin (BB 64)       30 Sept 1991

Later, on 4 January 1999, New Jersey was once again stricken, and Iowa was reinstated on the Naval Vessels Register, in Category B reserve. This switch was accomplished to allow donation of New Jersey to her home state.

In 1996 it was announced that Missouri would become a museum at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Ownership of the vessel was transferred to a private preservation group in May, 1998, and she arrived at Pearl Harbor in June, 1998. She is now open as a museum, berthed at Ford Island.

New Jersey was towed to New Jersey late in 1999, and will become a museum at Camden, NJ.

Wisconsin is berthed at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. She is scheduled to become a pseudo-museum at Nauticus, in Norfolk. She will be open for weather-decks-only touring, but will remain US Navy property and will be maintained in reserve.

Iowa is at NETC Newport, Rhode Island, having been relocated from Philadelphia. There are efforts underway to have her towed to San Francisco, in anticipation of her eventual donation as a museum there. She might become a pseudo-museum, much like Wisconsin, prior to final donation.

On 17 Jan 1950 Missouri ran aground on Thimble Shoals while departing Norfolk. Captain William Brown had recently taken command of the ship. Her was instructed to make a calibration run on the acoustic range as the ship left port. The CO failed to consult the charts before heading out, and he mistook a line of spar bouys along the shoals for the range markers along the acoustic range. The XO and navigator attempted to warn him that he was headed into shoal water, but he refused to listen. Missouri went into the mud at 12.5 knots; she coasted half a mile across the mudflats after the chief engineer shut down the engines to prevent their destruction.

Salvage efforts began immediately. Tugs, salvage ships and barges were sent out from Norfolk, an Army dredge was hurriedly summoned from the upper reaches of the Chesapeake, civilan dredges were contracted, and the pontoons built to salvage the submarine Squalus in the 1930's were towed down from Boston. All ammunuition, fuels, stores and other removable weights were lightered off, a channel was dredged around and behind the ship, and extensive networks of kedge anchors and beach gear were set up. The incomplete battleship Kentucky was floated out of her building dock on 20 January to clear that facility for Missouri's repairs.

Missouri was pulled off on 1 Feb 1950 by a force of 23 vessels. There were 14 fleet and salvage tugs: 5 pulling alongside, 6 pulling directly astern and 3 swinging the bow to break her loose from the muck. 2 salvage ships were moored astern, each connected to the ship by two sets of beach gear and moored to five anchors; they pulled up on their anchor lines and hauled in on the beach gear in addition to pulling like tugs. There were 7 yard tugs assigned to keep the larger vessels in position. In addition there were 9 kedge anchors set out around the battleship, being hauled on by the battleship's winches.

Damage was relatively light, consisting mainly of some dented and torn plates; there was no permanent damage. Repairs were completed in a 5 day drydocking at Norfolk. It is often stated that Missouri's "keel was bent" and that this damage was an impairment later in the ship's career; this is not correct. Although the ship's keel was somewhat bent and distorted in places, all significant damage was repaired during the drydocking. Any remaining distortion is of a cosmetic nature only.

Other reports often say Missouri's #2 barbette was permanently "cracked"; this is also untrue. In reality a crack was found in the ship's #3 barbette at second deck level; it is not clear if this damage was even a result of the grounding, but it was discovered during post-grounding inspections. The crack was welded closed during post-grounding repairs and has not been a problem since then.

Missouri was not limited to 15 knots as has been stated in the past; she made 30+ knots during her final reactivation.

Many questions are asked regarding the reasons certain seemlingly "young" cruisers were decommissioned during the early 1990's fleet drawdown.

The Leahy class (CG 16-24) and Belknap class (CG 26-34) ships were decommissioned as part of post-Cold War cutbacks. Although they has just been through the New Threat Upgrade (NTU), giving them a new AAW combat system, they were considered to be excess to requirements. They had manning- and maintainance-intensive high-pressure steam power plants, the last such systems in US warships (other than carriers); they were approaching the end of their 30-year service lives. Also, their AAW systems were adapted to counter threats at high altitude and long range, such as the threat presented by hordes of Soviet bombers. With the demise of the Soviet Union, this threat was greatly reduced. Current threats are seen as saturation attacks by pop-up cruise missiles, requiring rapid fire missile launchers. The old CGs' Mk 10 launchers are slow firing, requiring manual finning of the missiles prior to launch. Thus, they were expensive ships, poorly adapted to current threats, so they were eliminated. Belknap was replaced as 6th Fleet flagship by La Salle (AGF 3).

Long Beach (CGN 9), the oldest nuclear cruiser, was decommissioned in 1994, primarily due to age. She was 33 years old (3 years beyond her planned life span), and was completely worn out.

Bainbridge (CGN 25) and Truxtun (CGN 35) were similar to the Leahy and Belknap classes, so remarks for those vessels apply here. Also, both of these ships would have required expensive nuclear refuellings, so they were discarded.

The elimination of the Virginia class (CGN 38-41) cruisers is not as easy to understand. They were new, modern ships; given a NTU overhaul they would have been well suited to modern threats (they had rapid-fire Mk 26 launchers). Their major weakness was a lack of helicopters. In this case economics doomed the ships. They were coming due for nuclear refuellings, mid-life overhauls and NTUs, all expensive projects. Further, they had relatively large crews, straining USN personnel resources. Given less need for cruisers, it was decided to eliminate these ships as a money saving measure.

The California class CGNs, despite having gone through the NTU overhaul, suffered from high operating costs and large personnel requirements, so they were decommissioned 1 October 1998.

None of the ships were laid up in reserve because of the cost of mothballing and maintainance, the very small probability that the ships would ever be reactivated, and the even smaller possibilty that they could be reactivated quickly enough if they were ever needed.

The USN force requirement for cruisers seems to be 22 ships (2 for each of 11 carrier groups); there are 22 VLS Ticonderogas and 5 non-VLS Ticonderogas in service. The 5 early Ticonderogas have been mainly relegated to secondary duties, leaving the 22 VLS Ticonderogas as the only cruisers assigned to carrier groups. The first 5 Ticonderogas may be upgraded with VLS during the late 1990's, bringing the cruiser force up to 27 modern ships.

Disposal for the nuclear cruisers is similar to that of the nuclear submarines. The official start of disposal is the date the ship is deactivated and placed In Commission, In Reserve (ICIR); deactivation work sometimes begins before this date. The ship is then completely stripped; all weapons, electronics, nuclear materials, hazardous waste, reusable equipment and the entire superstructure is removed. This reduces the ship to a bare hulk with nothing projecting above the main deck. The hulk is then formally decommissioned and stricken from the NVR. Eventually it is towed to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNSY), where the hulks are stored until there is space for them in the scrapping program.

#       Name            ICIR date       Strike date     Strip location
CGN 9   Long Beach      7 July 1994     1 May 1995      Newport News
CGN 25  Bainbridge      1 Aug 1995      6 Oct 1995      Norfolk Navy
CGN 35  Truxtun         10 Oct 1994     11 Sept 1995    Puget Sound Navy
CGN 36  California      1 Oct 1998	9 July 1999	Puget Sound Navy
CGN 37  South Carolina  1 Oct 1998	30 July 1999	Norfolk Navy
CGN 38  Virginia        26 Feb 1994     29 Nov 1994     Norfolk Navy
CGN 39  Texas           31 May 1993     16 July 1993    Puget Sound Navy
CGN 40  Mississippi     31 Aug 1995     28 July 1997    Norfolk Navy
CGN 41  Arkansas        18 October 1997 7 July 1998     Puget Sound Navy 

The way warships are classified tends to be controversial, and there is no set definition for the meaning of the terms. There are, however, some nearly "standard" classifications that can be applied to most major warships. The designations listed here attempt to be "universal" to the greatest degree possible. Keep in mind that many nations chose to "do things their own way" at one time or another. An excellent example is the US Navy's use of the term "frigate" from the 1950s to 1975 (see below).

Also remember that the definitions of terms tend to change over time, and several classifications may be applicable to a single warship as the ship and the classifications evolve. For example, a typical destroyer built during WWII and still in service in 1996 would still be classified as a destroyer, but it would be more similar to a modern frigate, corvette or offshore patrol vessel depending on its level of modernization.

Some of these designations are applied retrospectively, that is, a modern designation is applied to older ships. For example, the "light carrier" classification was not used prior to WWII, but, looking back, it is obvious that some ships in service prior to WWII were certainly "light" when compared to the majority of ships in service.

These terms are defined as they apply to "modern" (post-US Civil War) steel, non-sail-powered warships.

• Aircraft Carriers: The key characteristic of an aircraft carrier is that the ship is designed to operate fixed-wing aircraft from a large flight deck, and is equipped to maintain those aircraft and carry their fuel, weapons, spares, etc.
  • Fleet Carrier (CV) This is the "standard" upon which carrier sub-types are based. Designation as a CV (as opposed to one of the specialized types) implies that the ship is a mainly multi-mission vessel, similar in size to the majority of CVs in service at the time, intended for use as the major vessel of offensive task forces. Capable of operating against enemy surface, air, submarine threats.
  • Large Carrier (CVB) Fleet carrier with heavier armor and armament than contemporary fleet carriers. Origin of designation may be "Battle Carrier".
  • Attack Carrier (CVA) Fleet carrier operating primarily (nuclear) attack aircraft, rather than a full range of multi- and special-mission aircraft. A mainly political classification to indicate nuclear capabilty.
  • Light Carrier (CVL) or Light Fleet Carrier A smaller fleet carrier operating the full range of aircraft operated by a contemporary fleet carrier, but fewer of them. Capable of operating tactically with fleet carriers. Differs from a CVE primarily in being intended for offensive operations, and thus having higher speed and greater armament. Generally built on a warship-type hull, rather than a merchant hull as in a CVE.
  • AntiSubmarine Carrier (CVS) Operating anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft as the center of an ASW task group. Differs from a CVE in being faster and being a true warship, rather than a converted merchant design.
  • Seaplane Carrier Ship intended to carry and operate seaplanes in scouting or offensive roles. Although the designation CVS is associated with seaplane carriers, it is rarely used, to avoid confusion with Antisubmarine Carriers.
  • Escort Carrier (CVE) Small, slower, generally mass-produced carrier intended as a convoy escort, particularly ASW escort. Generally lightly armed and armored, not intended for operation against enemy surface or air threats. Note that the differentiations between CVL, CVS and CVE is based on equipment and mission, not size of the ship. Many CVEs were actually larger than contemporary CVLs, but slower, less well armed/armored, and intended for a different mission.

• Monitor: Monitors are slow vessels with minimal freeboard and extremely limited seagoing ability, equipped with one or more guns in armored turret(s) and relatively little secondary armament, intended for defensive ship-to-ship combat in coastal waters, or offensive shore bombardment. Monitors differ from coast defense battleships in the means of accomplishing the defensive role: coast defense battleships would meet the enemy fleet some distance out to sea, while monitors would wait along the coastline for the enemy to come to them. The coastal combatant role was a feature of the second half of the 19th century; the shore bombardment role appeared during both World Wars.

• Battleships (BB): Battleships were the primary warships in the era of ship-to-ship combat with guns. They were equipped with the largest and greatest number of guns possible, and were heavily armored to protect them from similar enemy ships. Battleships were intended to engage in ship-on-ship or fleet-on-fleet combat with forces of enemy battleships. Battleship armor was generally heavy enough to protect the ship against it's own main armament.
  • Turret Ship/Barbette Ship Evolutionary step between monitors and battleships, with improved freeboard and seagoing capability compared to monitors, but often with only one main turret and still with somewhat limited speed and seagoing ability.
  • Coast Defense Battleship/Coastal Battleship Battleship intended for defense against enemy fleets, generally slow and limited in seagoing ability, equipped with a very heavy secondary armament. Capable of operating at sea, but not for long periods.
  • Pre-Dreadnought Designation applied retrospectively to battleships designed prior to the appearance of Dreadnoughts in 1906. Marked by slow speed (usually), fewer main guns, a heavy "intermediate" battery, and often much heavier secondary and tertiary armament compared to Dreadnoughts. In these ships both the main and intermediate batteries were intended to engage battleships.
  • Semi-Dreadnought Sometimes applied to Pre-Dreadnought type ships built late in the pre-dreadnought era or early in the dreadnought era and incorporating some Dreadnought features such as no intermediate armament, secondary armament in turrets, reduced light armament, higher speed, etc.
  • Dreadnought Evolved battleship type that appeared in 1906. Featured higher speed than previous ships, a totally uniform main battery, no intermediate battery, reduced secondary and light batteries. In these ships only the main battery was intended to engage battleships.
  • Super Dreadnought Used to describe Dreadnoughts with a guns larger than the original 11-12 inches. Infrequently used.
  • Fast Battleship Any battleship with speed significantly higher than the prevalent battleship fleet speed at the time.
  • Pocket Battleship Inaccurate term applied to some 1930's German warships, actually variants on the heavy cruiser type, but armed with exceptionally large guns.
  • Light Battleship Sometimes applied to battleship-type vessels that had smaller guns and less armor than contemporary battleships, but were still armored on a battleship scale, i.e. protected against their own shells.

• Cruisers: Cruisers are an extremely large and varied group.
  • Battlecruiser (BC) Dreadnought equivalent of the Armored Cruiser. Essentially a high-speed battleship, trading armor and armament for greater speed. Intended as a scouting ship and to hunt commerce raiders, but often employed in the battle line, with disastrous results. The traditional battlecruiser was mostly extinct by the 1920's. There is some dispute over whether a group of 1930's-1940's ships were Large Cruisers or an updated version of the Battlecruiser.
  • Large Cruiser (CB) This is a controversial type. It is generally applied to ships of the late 1930's-early 1940's that were between heavy cruisers and battleships in size and capability. Depending on which side of the issue you take, the ships were exactly what their name says--larger versions of the heavy cruisers--or they were simply a modern rendition of the battlecruiser. In any case, these ships were characterized by guns in the 11-12" range and armor to protect them against cruiser (8") shells.
  • Armored Cruiser (ACR) or 1st Class Cruiser, Heavy Cruiser (CA) The largest of the popular cruiser types, the classification of these ships has changed over time. In general, these cruisers are dual-role offensive/defensive ships, operating as defensive screens for major fleet units against enemy cruisers, hunting commerce raiders, raiding commerce themselves, offensive surface combatants, and served as flagships for squadrons of smaller cruisers. They were capable of independent offensive operations. Armored cruiser and 1st class cruiser are pre-dreadnought designations for large, often battleship-like vessels. Heavy cruisers are later (post-WWI) ships, whose design is evolved from light and scouting cruisers. Heavy Cruiser was defined by the London Treaty (1930) as having 6.1 to 8 inch main guns, making it one of the few clearly defined warship types in recent memory.
  • First Class Protected Cruiser (UK), Semi-Armored Cruiser (US) These were intermediate types which saw limited service in some nations. Physically they were similar to armored cruisers, although more lightly armored. In terms of mission they were generally similar to proteced cruisers. They turned out to be a poor balance between the two types, and are often seen as white elephants. To avoid confusion with other cruiser types, it may be best to call these "large protected cruisers".
  • Protected Cruiser, 2nd Class Cruiser, Light Cruiser (CL) The smaller sisters to the armored/1st class/heavy cruiser group, these ships are also dual-role offensive/defensive ships. They operated as commerce raiders, fleet scouts, in support of larger cruisers, as defensive screens against enemy destroyers, as offensive surface combatants, and as leaders for groups of smaller ships. They were also capable of independent offensive operations. The Protected and 2nd class designations are pre-dreadnought types. Light Cruisers are a post-Dreadnought type, and are closely tied to the Scout Cruiser type. The Light Cruiser was defined by the London Treaty (1930) as having 6" or smaller guns.
  • Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) Modern guided missile cruisers generally have only one of the traditional cruiser roles--they are either offensive or defensive, but not both. Typically offensive ships are equipped with heavy anti-ship missile batteries; defensive ships have anti-aircraft missiles to defend task forces. Niether type is truly capable of independent offensive operations as traditional cruisers were. A few guided missile cruisers have combined the offensive and defensive batteries in one large hull, but these are few and far between. Designation as a guided missile cruiser is usually a political and economic issue, not a naval one.
  • 3rd Class Cruiser, Sheathed Cruiser, Colonial Cruiser, Gunboat (PG) The next step down the cruiser size scale, these ships were constructed for duty in areas where a presence was required but there was no significant threat. Thus they were typically slower and lightly armed and armored. In wartime such ships would have been supplemented by larger cruisers. They often operated as leaders for destroyers or small patrol craft. This gunboat classification only applies to the larger breed of gunboats; some other gunboats were small fast attack craft. This entire classification was mostly extinct by the end of WWI.
  • Scout Cruiser (CS) Small, very fast cruisers intended to act as battlefleet scouts. Often simply an enlarged destroyer type, but some of the larger Scout Cruisers evolved into the modern light cruisers. Often employed as destroyer leaders. Rolled into the light cruiser classification by the 1930's.
  • AntiAircraft Cruiser (CLAA) Another small, very fast cruiser type that was essentially a large destroyer. A late 1930's-1940's type; often used as destroyer leaders. This designation is sometimes applied to modern cruisers that are optimized for the defensive AAW role.

• Destroyer Types: The destroyer types have seen numerous changes in role over the years, as can be seen from the descriptions below.
  • Frigate (DL/DLG, US 1950-1975) This was a new type midway between cruisers and destroyers in size. They carried most of the armament of a cruiser, minus the offensive weapons, on an enlarged destroyer hull. See section F.8.
  • Destroyer Leader A large destroyer intended to act as a squardon flagship and leader for destroyers, to protect them from enemy cruisers. Mostly extinct by WWII as destroyers grew in size. Small cruisers were often employed in this role, in addition to purpose-built ships.
  • Destroyer (DD/DDG) Small, fast, heavily armed escorts intended to protect the battlefleet from enemy surface, air or undersea threats, depending on the era. Destroyers originated as "torpedo-boat destroyers", intended to sink enemy torpedo boats. Anti-submarine warfare was added when submarine became a threat. As aircraft became more important the destroyers added an anti-aircraft role. Destroyers are primarily defensive in nature and generally operate in groups rather than independently. In a modern context, DDs are the major anti-submarine ships and DDGs are anti-aircraft ships, but they retain multi-mission capabilities.
  • Destroyer Escort (DE, US 1940's-1950's), Ocean Escort (DE, US 1950's-1975), Frigate (FF/FFG, world and US post-1975), Escort Destroyer (DDE) New type originating in WWII as a slow, cheap, mass-produced anti-submarine vessel for convoy defense. Destroyer escorts/frigates were rapidly built during WWII. Older destroyers were converted for anti-submarine duties as escort destroyers during and after WWII. These ships are traditionally single-mission vessels (ASW in most cases, AAW for FFGs), but in modern times they are becoming a general- purpose surface combatant.
  • Torpedo Boat Small, fast vessel intended to attack enemy battlefleets with torpedoes. Generally replaced by the torpedo boat-destoyer (destroyer) early in the 1900's, but some small destroyers were later classified as "torpedo boats" to distinguish them from larger destroyers. Should not be confused with "motor torpedo boats" or "patrol torpedo boats" (MTB/PT), which were small fast attack craft.

• Patrol/Escort Types:
  • Sloop A multi-mission convoy escort type most common after WWI and prior to WWII. Slow, but with long range to operate with convoys. This type was mostly replaced by destroyer escorts/frigates during WWII.
  • Patrol Frigate (PF) Coastal convoy escort type, essentially a destroyer escort/frigate type suited only for coastal work. Single role ASW.
  • Corvette Small, generally slow escort-type vessel, generally intended for ASW. Best suited for coastal work but sometimes employed as a seagoing vessel. Often seem to be heavily armed for their size, but generally are lacking in things like sensors, electronics, reloads, range and accomodations.
  • Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Modern classification for vessels similar in purpose to the 3rd class cruisers. Intended for duty in areas requiring presence but not major fighting power. Vessels tend to be optimized for good seakeeping, long range, good accomodations, easy maintainance and reliability. Generally slow and seemingly underarmed for their size.

Which sunken German ships remain at Scapa Flow?

Of the numerous German ships scuttled at Scapa Flow in 1919, only seven major ships remain; all the rest have been salvaged over the years. The remaining ships are the battleships Konig, Kronprinz Wilhelm, and Markgraf; light cruisers Brummer, Dresden, Coln, Karlsruhe. There are also a number of smaller German vessels left on the bottom at Scapa Flow, along with several British blockships, and many pieces cut off other German ships during salvage operations.

Photos of some of the remaining ships can be found at http://www.gunsofscapa.demon.co.uk/.

The following Royal Navy ships were lost or damaged during the 1982 Falkands War. Data provided by Michael P. Reed, from Air War: South Atlantic (Jeffery Ethell & Alfred Price).

• 1 May 1982: Arrow (F173) damaged by 30mm cannon fire, Glamorgan (D19) by bomb splinters, by three Daggers of Grupo 6 off Port Stanley.
• 4 May 1982: Sheffield (D80) hit by an Exocet from a Super Etendard from 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Escuadrilla at 11:02AM, 100 miles south of Port Stanley. It is generally thought that the missile did not explode, but some claim it actually did explode. Sheffield sank under tow 10 May.
• 12 May 1982: Glasgow (D88) hit by a 1000 pound bomb, from an A-4 from Grupo 5, which passed through the ship amidships leaving 3 foot holes near the waterline, before exploding outside the ship. Glasgow was forced to withdraw from the operational area to make repairs.
• 21 May 1982
  • Argonaut (F56) suffered light damage from a Macchi 339 of 1st Naval Attack Escuadrilla off San Carlos Water at 10:36AM. At 2:30 she was attacked by six A-4s and severely damaged by two 1,000 lb bombs. One hit just above the waterline between the boiler and engine room, hitting seveal steam pipes, exploding a boiler, and destroying part of the steering gear. The second hit below the waterline, passed through two fuel tanks, the sonar compartment, and into the Sea Cat Magazine detonating two missiles. Neither bomb exploded.
  • Antrim (D18) hit in the stern by a 1000 lb bomb from a Dagger of Grupo 6 which "pierced her missile loading doors, narrowly missed a fully armed Seaslug missle, smashed through a fan compartment and a pyrotechnic locker, then demolished a calorifier before it came to rest in a lavatory area." The bomb failed to detonate.
  • Broadsword (F88) strafed by Daggers of Grupo 6 off San Carlos Water at 11AM and again at 2:40.
  • Ardent (F184) attacked at 2:30 by Daggers of Grupo 6, and struck by a 1000 lb bomb which exploded near the stern, destroying the Seacat launcher. At 2:45 PM was attacked by A-4s of Grupo 5 and hit by two bombs which exploded toward the stern. Shortly thereafter attacked by 3 A-4s of the 3rd Naval Fighter and Attack Escuadrilla, and struck by at least two Mk82 Snakeyes. She sank some six hours later. Regarding the use of aluminum in the construction of this ship, the authors remark:
    "Several commentators have written that modern warships with aluminium structures are not strong enought to sustain major battle damage. The example of this particular frigate would suggest otherwise. 'I was amazed how strong she was, she had taken one hell of a hammering,' commented Alan West. Later the board of inquiry into the loss of Ardent would establish that she had been hit by no fewer than seven 1,000-pound and 500-pound bombs which exploded, and at least two others which lodged inside her but did not go off."
  • Brilliant (F90) lightly damaged by strafing off San Carlos Water.
• 23 May 1982: Antelope (F170) attacked by A-4s from Grupo 5 and the 3rd Naval Fighter and Attack Escuadrilla in San Carlos Water, and hit by two bombs, which did not explode on impact. One bomb later detonated while being defused, blowing a hole from the waterline to the funnel and starting an uncontrollable fire which later ignited the magazines, resulting in Antelope's loss.
• 24 May 1982: Sir Bedivere (L3004) had a bomb "glance off her foredeck", ricochet off the water and hit Sir Galahad (L3005). Sir Lancelot (L3029) was hit by another bomb on her starboard side. Neither bomb exploded.
• 25 May 1982
  • Six A-4s of Grupo 5 attack Broadsword (F88) and Coventry (D118) off Pebble Island. Two first attacked Broadsword whose FCR broke lock, and was hit by a bomb skipping over the water in the stern and through the flight deck and a Lynx, but did not explode. 2nd pair attacked Coventry who crossed in front of Broadsword again causing the FCR to break lock, and was struck by three bombs all which exploded; she capsized and sank.
  • Two Super Etendards, after refuelling from a KC-130, attack the Task Force from the north firing their missiles at the carriers. The missiles were probably decoyed by chaff, with one relocking onto Atlantic Conveyor (a civilian container ship under charter to RN), which was hit on the port side and exploded. She burned out and sank on 30 May.
• 8 June 1982
  • Plymouth (F126) attacked by five Daggers from Gruppo 6 off San Carlos Water, and hit by 4 bombs which failed to explode. One went through the funnel; two skipped off the water, traveled through the Limbo mount, and out the other side. The fourth bounced off the flight deck exploding a depth charge.
  • Five A-4s from Grupo 5 attacked Sir Tristram (L3505) and Sir Galahad (L3005) off Fitzroy. Both ships were severely damaged by exploding bombs; Sir Galahad was later towed offshore and scuttled.
• 12 June: Glamorgan (D19) damaged by a shore launched Exocet, which failed to explode.

There are many misconceptions and incorrect stories regarding the use of aluminum in warship construction.

One common story is that HMS Sheffield, a destroyer sunk during the 1982 Falkland War, was lost because her alleged aluminum superstructure made her more vulnerable to damage. This story is completely untrue, because Sheffield's superstructure was not aluminum. Like all ships of her class, her hull and superstructure were entirely steel. Aluminum played no role in her loss.

Two Royal Navy warships lost during the Falklands War did have aluminum superstructures, and their loss is incorrectly attributed to this feature. Ardent was hit by seven 500- and 1000-pound bombs, plus at least two more bombs which failed to detonate, and sank some six hours after the attack. Any warship of her size, regardless of aluminum or steel construction, would likely be sunk by this many bombs, so aluminum cannot be blamed here. Antelope, another aluminum-superstructure ship, was struck by two bombs, which lodged in the ship but failed to explode. Later, while one of the bombs was being defused, it exploded, blowing a major hole in the hull and starting a large fire. The fire eventually reached the magazines, causing these to explode. Again, an aluminum superstructure appears to have little connection to the ship's loss, which was caused by the explosion of the bomb and the magazines.

A related story claims the US Navy and Royal Navy abanonded aluminum superstructures, in favor of steel, as a result of the Falklands war. Since aluminum superstructures played little or no role in the Falkands losses, this story is obviously untrue. The Royal Navy's switch to steel appears to be a result of a 1977 fire in the frigate Amazon. In the US Navy, the switch from aluminum to steel superstructures was a result of the 1975 collision between the carrier John F. Kennedy and the cruiser Belknap. The collision caused major fires aboard the cruiser, and her aluminum superstructure essentially melted; she was reduced to a badly burnt hulk. This incident lead to a decision to adopt steel superstructures in the next new warship class, the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class destroyers. This decision had been made prior to the Falkands War.

From the 1950's to 1975, the US Navy had three types of fast task force escorts, plus one type of convoy escort. The task force escorts were Cruisers (CLG/CG), Frigates (DL/DLG), and Destroyers (DD/DDG); the convoy escorts were Ocean Escorts (DE/DEG), often known as destroyer escorts. In addtion, in the early 1970's there was a new group of ocean escort-type vessels being built with Patrol Frigate (PF) classifications. In 1975 these classifications were simplified to Cruiser (CG), Destroyer (DD/DDG) and Frigate (FF/FFG).

Under the pre-1975 classification, cruisers were large vessels, the size of WWII gun cruisers, intended as the primary surface combatants. They were to carry the long-range Talos missile, and, in many cases, strategic weapons such as Regulus or Polaris (but these were not fitted). One cruiser was to be assigned to each carrier group. There were relatively few of these ships, due to their cost and because the Frigates could carry almost as many weapons as a Cruiser.

From 1950 to 1975, Frigates were a new type, midway between Cruiser and Destroyer sizes, intended as major task force escorts. The first ship of the type was a redesignated ASW cruiser; the next 4 were very large AAW (gun) destroyers, and the remainder were essentially oversize guided missile destroyers. They carried the mid-range Terrier missile, but no offensive (strategic) weapons.

Destroyers were developed from the WWII designs as the smallest fast task force escorts. DDs were fast ASW ships; DDGs were AAW ships carrying the short-range Tartar missile.

Ocean Escorts were an evolution of the WWII destroyer escort types. They were intended as convoy escorts and were designed for mobilization production in wartime or low-cost mass production in peacetime. DEs were ASW vessels; DEGs were AAW vessels with the short-range Tarter missile.

The US Frigate classification was not used by any other navy; similar vessels were either cruisers or destroyers in foreign service. The Ocean Escort type corresponded to foreign frigates (convoy escorts).

The Soviets defined "cruiser" differently, considering ships equivalent to US Frigates to be "cruisers". By 1974 there were only 6 ships in US service classified as Cruisers, but the Soviets had 19 ships classified as Cruisers in service with 7 more building. (All totals exclude gun-only cruisers.) All but two of the Soviet ships were relatively small vessels, roughly equivalent to US Frigates and far smaller than US Cruisers. The differing US and Soviet definitions of "cruiser" caused problems when comparisions were made between US and Soviet naval forces. A table comparing US and Soviet cruiser forces showed 6 US ships vs. 19 Soviet ships, despite the fact that there were 21 US "frigates" equal or superior to the Soviet "cruisers". This lead to the perception of a "cruiser gap", when in fact there was no gap.

To cure the "cruiser gap", the US Frigate (DL/DLG) classification was eliminated on 30 June 1975. All the gun Frigates (DL) had been stricken prior to 1975. Most of the DLGs became Cruisers (CG) on 30 June 1975, but one class (Farragut) became Destroyers (DDG), due to their smaller size. The change from DLG to CG redefined the Cruiser type; cruisers were now smaller, more like large destroyers. Cruiser classifications were also simplified, with the Guided Missile Light Cruisers (CLG) simply becoming CGs.

At the same time the Ocean Escorts (DE/DEG) and Patrol Frigates (PF) became Frigates (FF/FFG).

Finally, the Attack Carriers (CVA/CVAN) became Multimission Carriers (CV/CVN). These changes brought US Navy classifications into line with foreign classifications, and eliminated the perceived "cruiser gap".

Pre-30 June 1975                Post-30 June 1975
----------------                -----------------
Attack Carrier (CVA/CVAN)       Multimission Carrier (CV/CVN)
Cruiser (CG/CLG)                Cruiser (CG)
Frigate (DL/DLG)                --
Destroyer (DD/DDG)              Destroyer (DD/DDG)
Ocean Escort (DE/DEG)           Frigate (FF/FFG)
Patrol Frigate (PF)             --

On 8 September 1923, the US Navy lost one and a half destroyer divisions in a mass grounding at Honda Point, California. On that night the ships of Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 11 were on a 24 hour run from San Francisco to San Diego, cruising at 20 knots. The flagship, USS Delphy (DD 261) was in the lead, followed by Destroyer Divisions 33, 31 and 32; ships as follows:

• DesDiv 33: S. P. Lee (DD 310), Young (DD 312), Woodbury (DD 309), Nicholas (DD 311)
• DesDiv 31: Farragut (DD 300), Fuller (DD 297), Percival (DD 298), Somers (DD 301), Chauncey (DD 296)
• DesDiv 32: Kennedy (DD 306), Paul Hamilton (DD 307), Stoddert (DD 302), Thompson (DD 305)

The ships turned east, supposedly into the Santa Barbara Channel, at 2100 hours. In reality the ships had were headed for the rocky shore, due to navigational errors, and unusual currents caused by the Tokyo earthquake of the previous week. The ships soon entered a thick fogbank, each vessel following the wake of the ship ahead. 5 minutes after the turn, Delphy ran ashore at 20 knots, quickly followed by other members of the squadron. S. P. Lee went ashore broadside to the cliffs to the north of Delphy. Young came ashore aft of Delphy, and was quickly rolled onto her side by the flagship's propeller wash. Woodbury wrecked on a group of rocks offshore. Nicholas stuck on a reef to seaward of S. P. Lee. Fuller was wrecked on the rocks just beyond Woodbury. Lastly, Chauncey grounded inshore of the capsized Young.

Somers and Farragut were warned by Delphy's siren and they slowed considerably before coming ashore; both were able to back off without major damage. The other ships of the squadron avoided grounding completely. The ships came to rest in two groups: a main group with Fuller, Woodbury, Young, Chauncey and Delphy roughly in a line, and S. P. Lee & Nicholas together to the north of the other ships. In the aftermath of the grounding Delpy capsized and Nicholas' bow broke off.

Rescue efforts began immediately. The survivors from Young escaped to Chauncey via a lifeline. Fishing boats summoned by the surviving ships worked among the rocks, plucking the crews off Fuller and Woodbury. Local ranchers, awakened by Delpy's siren, hastened to set up breeches buoys from the top of the cliffs down to the wrecked ships. Other survivors waded ashore through the rocks. 23 men were lost, mostly from the capsized Young. The survivors were taken to San Diego by special train shortly after being rescued.

The ships were total losses. They were stricken from the Register, stripped of useable equipment and sold to a scrapper for $1,035. No salvage work was done, and the ships remain where they were wrecked. Chauncey's remains are still visible. The area is now part of Vandenburg AFB.

See Flush Decks & Four Pipes by John D. Alden for more information.

In 1993 it was revealed that the US Navy had been testing a "stealth ship" since 1985. The vessel is named Sea Shadow. It uses first-generation stealth technology, making it the seaborne equivalent of the F-117 "stealth fighter". It is pure testbed, having no military capabilities. It was built to test seaborne stealth (radar, infrared and acoustic), SWATH hull design, ship control and automation technology and systems, structural and seakeeping technologies and hydrodynamic effects (wake and pressure). The vessel was developed by Lockheed and built inside the famous Hughes Mining Barge (HMB-1), originally built for Project Jennifer. HMB-1 was reacquired from the EPA in 1982, converted to a covered floating drydock at Todd Shipyards, and moored at Redwood City, CA. Construction of Sea Shadow began in 1983 and was completed in 1985.

Sea Shadow's configuration has been described as "a 1990's Merrimac", referring to the Civil War-era ironclad ram. It is a SWATH (Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull) vessel with all above-water surface sloped radically inward. She is 160 feet long, 70 feet in beam, 14 feet in draft, displaces 560 tons and her diesel-electric propulsion gives her a top speed of 13 knots. She has no combat systems or even a navigation radar. The diesel engines are mounted above water in the main hull, with electric motors in each of the submerged pontoons. She has a crew of 4, but additional personnel can be accomodated for tests.

Sea Shadow was tested at night in 1985-1986 and stored in HMB-1 at Redwood City until 11 April 1993, when it existence was announced so it could conduct three weeks of offshore daylight tests. Tests have included operations on radar and acoustic ranges, "can you see it" radar tests, seakeeping, hydrodynamic and structural tests, and automation/ship control tests. The vessel is reported to be essentially invisible to shipboard radar, even at close range. After the vessel was revealed it (in HMB-1) was moved to NAS Alameda. In 1995 HMB-1 and Sea Shadow were towed away for storage, the test program having been completed. In 1999 Sea Shadow was reactivated for testing of new technologies in support of the DD-21 program.

Stealth concepts tested in Sea Shadow have found their way into many USN ships, including DDG 51, AGOS 19, and LPD 17 classes.

Although it was reported that Sea Shadow took part in operations in Somalia, this has been proven to be untrue. Supposedly, video from the widely-televised first landing of SEALs and Marines in Somalia shows a Sea Shadow-like vessel offshore. It is known that HMB-1 did not leave the US during that period; Sea Shadow does not have the speed or range to transit the Pacific on its own. It would have been impossible to get HMB-1 and/or Sea Shadow across the Pacific undetected. Also, there was not enough advance notice to get Sea Shadow into position for those first landings. Whatever was seen offshore that night, it wasn't Sea Shadow.

There is great controversy over whether the Alaska class ships (CB 1-6) should be considered "battlecruisers" or "large cruisers". These ships, and some Russian, Dutch, and Japanese designs of the late 1930's and early 1940's were larger than the 8-inch-gunned heavy cruisers of the era and smaller than contemporary battleships, which carried 14" to 16" guns. The disputed ships were all of roughly the same size and all carried 9 11" or 12" guns as the main armament.

One side of the issue says they were exactly what the USN classification says: large cruisers. They are claimed to be simply the next step in heavy cruiser design, free of treaties which had limited the main armament to 8". This side points to the cruiser-like design features and missions of the ships. By this argument, they were "big cruisers", not "little battleships".

The other side of the issue says they were the WWII incarnation of the WWI battlecruisers. Their missions are claimed to be similar to the missions envisioned for the original battlecruisers. This side says their armament shows the same relationship to WWII battleships as battlecruiser armament showed to WWI battleships. By this argument they were "little battleships", not "big cruisers".

There has never been a general agreement on which answer is "right", and there probably never will be. The issues does, however, provide a source of interesting and generally civil discussion from time to time.

Why did USS Long Beach have those ancient 5 inch guns?

In the early 1960's the Navy was building a series of all-missile cruisers, which would not carry any guns. Among the ships were Long Beach (CGN 9) and the Albany class (CG 10-12). The missiles were supposed to be highly effective, shooting down enemy aircraft at long range, thus rendering guns excess and useless.

Sometime during 1961-1962 President Kennedy was aboard frigate Dewey (DLG 14), a missile- and gun-armed ship, observing a target exercise. A target drone was to approach the ship, and it would be shot down by the Navy's much-touted Terrier missiles. The drone appeared, a missile was fired, and the missile missed. Another missile was fired and missed. And another, and another....the total number of missiles fired is unknown, but it was at least several. By the time the target was finally destroyed, it had come so close that the ship surely would have been hit if the drone had been an enemy aircraft. The President was not impressed. He ordered that the all-missile ships be equipped with guns so they would have a means of engaging a target if the missiles failed to function properly.

Therefore Long Beach was given two single 5/38 mounts in the space that had been reserved for her never-installed Regulus missile system. The guns were drawn from stockpiles; they had been manufactured in 1944. They were installed during her post-shakedown overhaul. Remarkably, the guns were not removed or replaced during Long Beach's 1980-1983 reconstruction, although they were totally useless by this date. They remained operational through the end of Long Beach's career. The Albany class ships, converted from old heavy cruisers, were fitted with two open (unshielded) 5/38 mounts. Albany completed her conversion without the guns but was soon fitted with them. Her sisters received guns while still undergoing conversion.